Public and quasi-governmental enterprises control a substantial share of the country’s capital assets and economic activities and play a pivotal role in economic governance. Despite this position, they often face challenges such as managerial inefficiency, limited transparency, and weak accountability. This study argues that the core problem of these firms lies not merely in ownership type or operational shortcomings, but in institutional conflicts arising from the overlapping roles of the state. The government simultaneously acts as public owner, policymaker, regulator, and at times managerial intervener, creating misalignment among authority, responsibility, and accountability at the firm level. Adopting a qualitative, analytical–applied approach, the research draws on documentary analysis, corporate governance literature, and institutional analysis to examine ownership structures, control mechanisms, and the consequences of weak governance in quasi-governmental companies. The findings indicate that ambiguity regarding the ultimate owner, dispersion of ownership authority, and concurrent state interventions undermine board independence and disrupt accountability mechanisms. In response, the study proposes a three-layer corporate governance framework within a public ownership context, comprising the public ownership layer, the enterprise governance layer, and the state governance layer. The core principle of this model is the institutional separation of the state’s roles and the alignment of authority, responsibility, and accountability. Implementing this framework can enhance economic efficiency while simultaneously strengthening public accountability.